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This article investigates the events that unfolded during and after the visit of two Office of Strategic Service 
(OSS) agents to Lhasa in spring 1943. To date, not much is known about this first visit of American 
representatives to the state of Tibet, which happened at a time when the US and its allies’ strategic priority 
was the containment of Japanese influence in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater. Through an analysis of 
cables between the US government agencies in Washington and with embassies of allies in both Washington 
and Chongqing, this article reconstructs these events. More specifically, the complications that unfolded 
throughout the year 1943 can be traced back to the visit of Captain Ilia Tolstoy and Lieutenant Brooke Dolan 
to Lhasa in February. 
The major findings of this analysis are: 1) Lhasa was actively endeavoring independence from China and 
sought to do so by establishing friendly relations with the US, prior to the end of WWII; 2) the involvement of 
the OSS in the Tibetan independence struggle, at the time against the advice of the State Department, 
foreshadows the CIA’s actions in Tibet in the 1950s; 3) the suboptimal communication between US 
government agencies, as well as the secretiveness among the Allied forces, most prominently the Chongqing 
Government. 
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Introduction 
Early in 1943, two American envoys, who were 
also OSS agents – Captain Ilia Tolstoy (the émigré 
grandson of the famous Russian novelist) and 
Lieutenant Brooke Dolan – made their journey to 
Tibet to present a letter by President Roosevelt to 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama.1  
During their visit, the two agents learned that the 
Tibetans had great use for a set of long-range 
broadcasting devices. The Tibetans asked whether 
the Americans could supply one of these devices, 
as they had none. The request was proceeded to 
the OSS headquarters in Washington in due  
                                                 
1 Document 525. The Tibetan Regent (Tak-dak Pundit) 
to President Roosevelt, in Noble, G. Bernard and 
Perkins, E. Ralph. Foreign Relations of the United 
States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China. Department of 
State, Office of the Historian. 
practice, but when “preparations were made for the 
dispatch of the equipment, flustered State 
Department officials learned of the request. They 
objected the gift because it would be ‘politically 
embarrassing and cause irritation and offense to 
the Chinese,’ who had territorial claims on Tibet.”2 
The American mission to Tibet was not only a 
diplomatic endeavor, but also a strategic operation. 
The OSS, backed by India, sought to establish an 
alternative supply corridor to Burma in order to 
support the Allied war effort in China against 
Japan. Conversely, the State Department was 
concerned about the Chinese reaction to American 
assistance to Tibet, on which the KMT 
government in Chongqing had territorial claims. In 
                                                 
2 Richard Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's 
first Central Intelligence Agency. Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005. 255. 
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addition, the British, another ally, had their own 
view on, and interests in the situation of Tibet, 
which they did not hold back with when the 
British Embassy in Washington sent a letter to the 
Department of State informing the recipient on 
their interpretation of Tibetan sovereignty.3 
On May 18, 1943, the Chinese concentrated a 
force of 10,000 troops along the Tibetan border, 
reportedly to gain foothold of the region and to 
eventually bring Tibet under effective Chinese 
control.4 
This article investigates the events that unfolded 
after the visit of the two OSS agents in Lhasa in 
more detail. For this purpose, the author 
undertakes a thorough analysis of diplomatic 
cables that were sent or received by the State 
Department. Through this effort, the article 
provides a detailed reconstruction of the 
diplomatic, strategic, and military considerations 
by the parties involved, most notably the Tibetans, 
the Chinese, the British, and various US 
government agencies. The findings in this article 
are expected to inform the discourse of the Tibetan 
independence struggle, which is still going on 
today, as well as the role that American 
intelligence agencies played therein as early as 
1943. 
 
The CBI in the early 1940s and the OSS’ 
mission in China 
The broader context of this article is the Allied 
anti-Japanese war effort. Before the focus returns 
to the year 1943 and the Southeast-Chinese region, 
a brief exposition of the state of war in the CBI 
will be provided: World War II, from a Chinese 
Perspective, was essentially the 2nd Sino-Japanese 
War (中国抗日战争), which broke out on July 7, 
1937. Prior to 1937, Imperial Japan had already 
                                                 
3 Document 532, The British Embassy to the 
Department of State, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
4 Document 538, The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the 
Secretary of State, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
occupied parts of the Chinese mainland through its 
aggressive, expansionist policy in Asia.5  
Burma is of central priority for this paper’s 
analysis because the Japanese occupation of 
Burma from 1942 to 1945 interrupted Allied 
supply of ROC territory with headquarters in 
Chongqing from India, under British/ 
Commonwealth Control, to China by land route. 
Since Japan effectively controlled both China’s 
West, i.e. coastal regions and Burma, the Chinese 
Nationalist government—as well as Allied troops 
and officials under the lend-lease program of the 
Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) 
—were isolated. Therefore, the only supply route 
from India was by air; the so-called Hump,6 an 
airlift by an American military transport aircraft 
from Assam, India to Kunming in Yunnan, over 
the Eastern Himalayas.7 
General Stillwell,8 Rana Mitter,9 and Barbara 
Tuchman give accurate accounts of the dire 
situation of the Sino-American anti-Japanese war 
efforts in Burma.10 The general strategic quagmire 
that the Allies faced was accentuated by 
underlying discord in their own ranks. The British 
leadership, for instance, oftentimes showed little 
commitment to assist the Chinese fight against 
Japan unless it served their strategic interests. The 
Chongqing Government, as far as the British were 
concerned, was better left to “fall than to disrupt 
the major effort against Japan.”11 In general, 
London hoped for a victorious but weak post-
                                                 
5 Spence, Jonathan D. The search for modern China. 
WW Norton & Company, 1991. 443 ff. 
6 The Burma Road had been supplying some 20,000 
tons a month of supplies, to which the only alternative 
was to fly much smaller amounts across the Hump from 
India into China. See also Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: 
China's World War II, 1937-1945, Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 2013. 511. 
7 See for example Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude 
to Cold War, Naval Institute Press, 2013. 
8 Joseph Warren Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, Da Capo 
Press, 1991. 
9 Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-
1945. 
10 Barbara Wertheim Tuchman, Stilwell and the 
American Experience in China, 1911-1945., Macmillan, 
1971. 
11 Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-
1945. 299. 
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WWII China, in order to continue to maintain a 
British sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. After 
the war, the British hoped to regain control of 
Burma. General Joseph Stilwell was a strong 
supporter of a campaign to retake Burma and 
secure the land supply route from India to continue 
the anti-Japanese struggle, which in his opinion 
should rely mostly on ground troops.12 
The role of the OSS in the war at that time was 
still young; only the year before had Roosevelt 
created the OCI (Office of the Coordinator of 
Information) and made William Joseph Donovan 
its director. The organization was created prior to 
the United States’ official entry into the war to 
direct “un-American” subversive practices such as 
“espionage, sabotage, ‘black’ propaganda, [and] 
guerrilla warfare.”13 On June 13, 1942, a few 
months after Pearl Harbor, the OSS was created 
with a more general mission of intelligence 
collection and analysis, assisting other military and 
government agencies and special operations, thus 
gradually assuming the role of the US’ first 
centralized intelligence agency. The leadership, 
however, remained largely the same and so did the 
close tie to Roosevelt. The connection between 
Roosevelt and the OSS as his personal foreign 
policy arm is further exemplified by the fact that 
President Truman terminated the OSS briefly after 
the end of WWII. 
The OSS mission in the CBI included not only 
operations to assist the Kuomintang Forces and 
their intelligence apparatus around Dai Li,14 but 
also to lead them into Burma, Tibet, and the so 
called ‘Red China’, i.e. the Chinese Communist 
base in Yan’an where OSS agents also helped train 
and equip Mao’s and Zhu’s famous 8th Route 
Army.15 Among the agents sent to Yan’an was 
Lieutenant Dolan, who was part of the earlier 
Tibet mission (The Tibet Mission will be 
                                                 
12 Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in 
China, Chapter 8. 
13 Smith, OSS: the secret history of America’s First 
Central Intelligence Agency. 1. 
14 See for example Frederic E. Wakeman, Spymaster: 
Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service. Univ of 
California Press, 2003. 
15 Smith, OSS: the secret history of America's First 
Central Intelligence Agency. 255 ff. 
introduced in more detail in this article. For more 
detailed information on OSS missions in Europe 
and Asia, Smith gives an accurate account and Yu 
provides a detailed history of OSS activities in 
China). 
The Japanese Imperial Army that the Allied CBI 
forces under Stilwell’s command were up against 
was one that had proven itself capable to conquer 
and hold control over vast territories in Asia, not 
just in China’s east but also in Southeast Asia. 
After the Japanese success in Pearl Harbor, 
Japanese strategists were inspired to quickly 
capture Hong Kong and the Philippines. It 
suddenly seemed that the mighty British Army 
was not such a formidable foe, which made Burma 
look more like an attractive target. The main 
strategic value of the Japanese Burma campaign 
was to put a wedge between China and India, 
inhibiting supplies to the Chinese eastern-front, 
“and making the eastern flank of British India 
vulnerable. On February 9, the Japanese 15th 
Army moved to take the capital, Rangoon, and 
then drove north toward Toungoo and 
Mandalay.”16 
If not already evident earlier, the Sino-British rift 
became evident in the aftermath of the Japanese 
advance towards Burma. Chiang Kai-shek was 
ready to suspend the Fifth and Sixth Armies to 
help the British defend Rangoon, “but his gesture 
was rejected by Archibald Wavell, British 
commander in chief for India and supreme 
commander, Far East.”17 This rejection, felt in 
both Chongqing and Washington, was rooted in 
British imperial pride and their unwillingness to 
have their colony defended by the “dirty 
Chinese.”18 The British hubris was further 
punished by military disaster on February 15, 
when they lost their naval base in Singapore to 
Japan. It was during this time that Stilwell arrived 
in Chongqing to assume his position under the 
supreme commander of the Allied Forces, while 
General Chiang Kai-shek was set as the chief of 
staff of the Allied Forces in the CBI. Initially, 
                                                 
16 Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-
1945. 533. 
17 Ibid. 533. 
18 Ibid. 533. 
  6 
Chiang was accommodating of Stilwell, which is 
mostly of what he represented; a gesture of 
closeness between the US and China, but clearly 
“he had no intention of actually ceding command 
to a Westerner.”19 
Stilwell’s campaign to reclaim Burma at the end of 
March with two of Chiang’s best armies went 
without success. If we can believe Stilwell’s diary, 
the sole reason for the campaign’s failure was 
incapacity of and miscommunication with 
Chongqing and the Generalissimo’s premature 
decision to retreat.20 In the weeks to follow, 
Stilwell attempted to reinstate control in Burma, a 
mission that went terribly wrong; Stilwell and his 
remaining troops were trapped in the Burmese 
Jungle in late April. Of these forces, Stilwell 
managed to save a group of eighty people, 
“including American, Chinese, and British 
soldiers, Indian engineers, and Burmese nurses. 
Stilwell led this unlikely group on a terrifying 
journey through a jungle where disease and 
snakebite were as much a threat as the enemy.”21 
On May 20th, the group reached India, and from 
there Stilwell went back to China. From then on 
relations between Stilwell and Chiang remained 
sour because both blamed the failed Burma 
campaign on each other.22 The Japanese army 
pushed back all Chinese troops and secured 
Burma, but did not advance further into China or 
India because their objective, i.e. denying supply 
of the Chinese through India, had succeeded. 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 535 
20See also Stilwell and White, The Stilwell Papers. 
21 Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-
1945. 545. 
22 In addition to the fact that Stilwell, in Chiang’s 
opinion, had jeopardized the Burma mission through his 
miscalculations which cost the deaths of 25,000 
Chinese and 4,500 British and Indian troops, the loss of 
Burma lead to another instant that would further 
exacerbate Stilwell-Chiang relations: Some 45,000 tons 
of Lend-Lease supplies intended for China were now 
instead assigned to the Nationalist armies that had made 
it to India. Throughout the war, Stilwell would retain 
control over the Lend-lease he favored, and 
exacerbating tensions that would corrode the alliance 
with the Nationalists. (Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s 
World War II, 1937-1945. 533). 
Tibet in 1943 and the Tolstoy-Donovan Mission 
to Lhasa 
The so-called rooftop kingdom of Asia had 
enjoyed factual autonomy and independence from 
China since the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. 
While the Kuomintang government officially 
continued to claim suzerainty over Tibet, they 
were not able to project actual control over the 
vast mountainous territory in China’s far west. The 
events of 1942, in particular the loss of Burma to 
the British, did not create the tensions between 
Tibet and China. It rather elevated these onto the 
stage of WWII-Asia and into the consciousness of 
the Allied Powers, more specifically, that of the 
British and the Americans; the KMT Government 
had already earlier demanded from Lhasa to allow 
the transit of military equipment and other goods 
through Tibetan territory. The Tibetans, however, 
did not want to create “any excuse for a Chinese 
presence in Tibetan territory [and refused]. They 
feared that should arrangements go awry, the 
Chinese army and their ‘new’ equipment and men 
might acquire a permanent home on Tibetan 
roads.”23 
The need for the Americans to move cargo through 
Tibet was apparent due to the loss of Burma in 
1942. Therefore, the OSS made the plan to send 
two agents to Lhasa to talk to the Tibetans 
directly; their alleged mission: “to survey a 
possible supply route from India to China via Tibet 
to replace the Burma Road that had two months 
earlier fallen to the Japanese.”24 Initially, Lhasa 
refused the admission of the two Americans, 
presumably because rejecting foreigners from 
countries that had not established relations to their 
territory was due practice for Tibetan officials at 
that time, or alternatively, because this request was 
presented to the Tibetans through middlemen of 
the Chinese government. Only through the help of 
British officials in India could Frank Ludlow, head 
of the British Mission to Lhasa, be persuaded to 
talk to the Tibetan Foreign Minister Surkhand 
Szasa regarding this matter. Ludlow presented the 
                                                 
23 Lezlee Brown Halper, and Stefan Halper, Tibet: An 
Unfinished Story, Oxford University Press, 2014. 29. 
24 Ibid. 30. 
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reasonable argument that the visit of the two 
Americans should be advantageous to Tibet’s 
political future.25 
While the two Americans were officially sent to 
Tibet to present regards from President Roosevelt 
and examine the prospects to find an alternative 
supply line for China, it later became clear that 
their actual orders had come from General Stilwell 
and Donovan with a mission to observe the 
“attitudes of [sic] people of Tibet; to secure allies 
and discover enemies; locate strategic targets and 
survey the territory as a possible field for future 
activities.”26 What made this journey of Tolstoy 
and Dolan into Tibet so remarkable is that it 
represented the first official visit of representatives 
of the US government to Tibet. It appears that 
especially Tolstoy made a great impression on the 
Dalai Lama, to whom he was granted an audience, 
where Tolstoy presented the gifts Roosevelt had 
given them on their way: a gold watch and a silver 
framed picture of President Roosevelt together 
with a letter written by the President in person.  
The Tolstoy-Dolan mission was a success in many 
ways. The Tibetans not only welcomed the two 
Americans with all honors and even an audience 
with the Dalai Lama, but also responded with gifts 
and a note that read: “this is the first time that 
friendly relations were established between Tibet 
and the USA,”27 which illustrates that the Tibetans 
were aware of the historic precedent of the event 
as well as its meaning for Tibet’s future struggle as 
an independent country. 
During his visit, Tolstoy not only offered a radio 
transmitter, but suggested that a Tibetan delegation 
“attend a World Peace Conference to be held in 
1944; he had, in a moment of excess, overstepped 
the bounds of his position.”28 Both offers raised 
the question of Tibet’s diplomatic status, a 
question worth to be addressed by an official 
American perspective at another time. While 
Tolstoy and Dolan accomplished their mission of 
establishing friendly relations with the Tibetan 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 31. 
26 Declassified OSS ‘Project FE 2’ File cited in Halper 
and Halper. Tibet: An Unfinished Story. 32. 
27 Ibid. 32. 
28 Ibid. 33. 
government, the visit did a disservice to American 
interests in the CBI, because in the year 1943, 
stable relations with China were more important 
than friendly relations and diplomatic 
commitments to a Buddhist kingdom on the top of 
the Himalaya. 
The supply road from India through Tibet to 
China, the reason for the mission in the first place, 
was not built in the end, because “it would take too 
long and have little impact on the war effort.”29 
 
Analysis of State Department Communications 
regarding the Tibet issue 
This chapter undertakes the analysis of cables 
between the State Department and several offices 
in Washington and Asia (OSS headquarters, 
American Delegations in New Delhi and 
Chongqing, British Delegations in Washington, 
New Delhi and Chongqing). The purpose of this 
analysis is to determine what diplomatic 
consequences unfolded after the two OSS agents 
had promised the Tibetans a radio transmitter set. 
On a side-note, one may point out that the first 
written exchanges between Lhasa and Washington 
all emphasize the mutual goodwill, sympathy, and 
gratitude regarding the historic precedent which 
constituted from this first encounter between 
representatives of the American and Tibetan 
people. On the 19th Day of the 1st Tibetan Month 
in the Water Sheep Year, which is calculated by 
the State Department as February 24, 1943, the 
Dalai Lama wrote to President Roosevelt, 
expressing great gratification for his letter and the 
tokens of goodwill (an autographed photo and an 
exquisite gold watch) through his envoys, Capt. I. 
Tolstoy and Lieut. Brooke Dolan. The Dalai Lama 
further expressed his appreciation for the interest 
that the people of the United States of America 
showed towards his country and pointed out the 
significance of the war that the people of the US, 
along with 27 other countries, were fighting 
against “nations bent on conquest who are intent 
upon destroying freedom of thought, of religion, 
and of action everywhere.” He goes on to 
emphasize that, “Tibet also values her freedom and 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 33. 
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independence enjoyed from time immemorial.”30 
The underlying message that the Dalai Lama sends 
to Washington is: embedded into his appreciation 
of the good fight for freedom by the US; that Tibet 
is and always was an independent country; and 
needs her political and religious freedoms 
protected which implies that these freedoms were 
being threatened, although the origin of the threat 
is not clearly stated. 
The first time the radio set gets mentioned is in the 
memorandum of a telephone conversation on 
March 20th by Alger Hiss (Assistant to the Adviser 
on Political Relations) and Colonel M. Preston 
Goodfellow of OSS, who reported that the Cabinet 
of Tibet had requested “a complete radio 
transmitting set for use for broadcasting within 
Tibet.” Furthermore, Colonel Goodfellow points 
out that the OSS “has such a set which could be 
made available for this purpose.” The Colonel 
finally reports that Donovan and the OSS in 
general believe that the two men in Tibet (Tolstoy 
and Dolan) “had done a good job of establishing 
friendly relations with the Tibetan authorities and 
that it would be helpful to our war effort in ‘the 
general area’ if the set should be sent.”31  
Ten days later, on March 30, George Atcheson Jr. 
(Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs) voices the first concerns over the possible 
implications that this radio transmitter might have. 
His assessment reads as follows: “After careful 
consideration of this matter in so far as it may 
affect our relations with China, we are of the 
opinion that to supply a radio transmitting set to 
the Tibetans would be politically embarrassing and 
cause irritation and offense to the Chinese.”32 The 
reasons Atcheson gives for this assessment are: (1) 
the Chinese had requested such a radio transmitter 
set under lend-lease two years earlier, which was 
                                                 
30 Document 527. The Dalai Lama of Tibet to President 
Roosevelt, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign Relations of 
the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China. 
31 Document 528. Memorandum of Telephone 
Conversation, by Mr. Alger Hiss, Assistant to the 
Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck). 
32 Document 529. Memorandum by the Assistance 
Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Atcheson), 
in Noble and Perkins, Foreign Relations of the United 
States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China. 
declined, (2) the Chinese would thus be offended, 
(3) the Chinese claim suzerainty over Tibet, which 
would not welcome the installation of a radio 
transmitter in Tibet, (4) that the Chinese would not 
object American visitors to Tibet in general, but 
not favor the supply of equipment that may be 
used against them.33 
Atcheson thus recommends that, “from the view of 
our relations with China, that these considerations 
be brought to the attention of the Office of 
Strategic Services; that that agency be urged to 
drop the proposal to ship a radio transmitter to the 
Tibetans and that some other gift be substituted 
therefore.”34 
When there was growing opposition against 
sending the radio set in the following weeks, 
Atcheson did not change his position on the matter 
in order to not upset the Chinese. On April 3rd, Mr. 
Hiss had another telephone conversation with 
Goodfellow inquiring whether it would be 
necessary for the State Department to reiterate its 
strong opposition against the provision of the radio 
set to Tibet in a more formal matter, as “unless 
OSS should decide to drop the matter of sending 
transmitting station to Tibet, [he] believed that the 
Department would wish to press its objections 
more strenuously.”35 However, Goodfellow made 
one remark that further complicated the situation. 
He pointed out that the radio set may not be seen 
as courtesy of the American Government, but 
rather be regarded as strategic asset for American 
use. Mr. Hiss, in due respect to his capacities as 
adviser on political relations, did not comment on 
this strategic matter and Goodfellow asserted that 
it indeed did not warrant “any reconsideration on 
[the State Department’s] part.”36 
Instead of a more formal expression of opposition 
by the State Department, Donovan personally 
wrote to Hornbeck (Department of State Adviser 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Document 530. Memorandum of Conversation, by 
Mr. Alger Hiss, Assistant to the Adviser on Political 
Relations (Hornbeck), in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
36 Ibid. 
  9 
on Political Relations) on April 12th, explaining the 
importance of continuing with the ‘matter’ 
regarding the newly established US-Tibet relations 
from a diplomatic perspective and adding the 
strategic element to be considered: If the Tibetan 
request for radio transmitters be complied with, it 
“will open the Tibet region 1200 miles east and 
west for Allied influence and further 
modernization of territory which will be 
strategically valuable in the future.”37 He also 
mentions that the US authorities in New Delhi and 
the Government of India were in agreement with 
this interpretation, i.e. the diplomatic and strategic 
value of providing the radio set. 
One week later, on April 19, the State Department 
received a seemingly unrelated letter by the British 
Embassy. The document does not mention the 
Tolstoy-Dolan mission or radio transmitters in any 
regard, yet it shows that for some reason the 
diplomats at the British Embassy in Washington 
must have felt the urge to enlighten the State 
Department on the status of Tibet. The reason why 
the British mention Tibet in the first place appears 
to be a conversation between Mr. Eden (British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) and T.V. 
Soong (Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs) on 
March 15, in which the “question of Tibet” was 
raised. For the remainder of the document, the 
British side explains at length what in their 
understanding the status of Tibet is, which is 
conform with the Chinese interpretation, i.e. in 
short that Tibet is a part of the Chinese Republic.38 
While the British document itself represents a 
well-researched analysis, or at least one possible 
interpretation of the status of Tibet in international 
legal terms (suzerainty under Qing Dynasty, the 
1913 Tripartite conference in Simla which was not 
ratified by the Chinese, the 1934 Huang Mu Sung 
mission to Lhasa etc.), it lacks any reference to the 
                                                 
37 Document 531. The Director of the Office of 
Strategic Services (Donovan) to the Adviser on Political 
Relations (Hornbeck), in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
38 Document 532. The British Embassy to the 
Department of State, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
events that had unfolded over the prior two 
months. Based on the document, the British side 
simply thought it might be of value to inform the 
American side on the conversation between the 
British and Chinese Secretaries and Ministers, 
respectively, of Foreign Affairs on the contents of 
their conversation, which happened to have 
revolved around the status of Tibet. 
On May 14, Mr. Merrell, the Chargé in India to the 
Secretary of State, sent a telegram to Washington 
which drew the attention away from the infamous 
radio transmitters and back to the question of the 
availability of Tibet as alternative supply route for 
lend lease equipment from India to China. The 
Tibetans finally agreed to the transportation of 
supplies to China after the Government of India 
had subsequently “pressed Tibet to act favorably 
on this long-standing question on grounds that 
continued refusal would lead to serious 
deterioration in relations between Tibet and 
China.”39 However, the Tibetan side only tolerated 
non-military shipments without foreign 
supervision through their territory. 
The next day a telegram reached the State 
Department that first confirmed that the Tibetans 
agreed to a supply route through their territory as a 
strategic measure to give no possible justification 
to Chongqing for “any aggression against Tibet by 
saying that all possibility of transport from India 
across Tibet was denied China.”40 It appears that 
there was sufficient reason to believe that the 
Chinese had already taken considerable 
preparations to invade Tibet: there reportedly were 
leaked orders by the Generalissimo to his 
governors in Sikang, Yunnan and Qinghai to send 
troops to the Tibetan border and the Tibetans were 
urged by the British Government, who had known 
of this, to agree to the supply route.  
                                                 
39 Document 534. The Chargé in India (Merrell) to the 
Secretary of State, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
40 Document 536. The Chargé in India (Merrell) to the 
Secretary of State, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
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This intelligence differs from the telegram one day 
earlier, which states that it was the Indian 
Government that had taken influence on the 
Tibetan decision. Yet, since the British controlled 
India, the terms British and Indian Government 
were interchangeable. The telegram from May 15th 
contains information on the whereabouts of 
Tolstoy and Dolan for the first time since the Dalai 
Lama had written at the end of February that the 
two representatives of the American people had 
left Lhasa headed for China. Merrell had just 
received a letter from Tolstoy sent from within 
Tibetan territory, dated April 17, reporting that 
Chinese and Tibetan troops were “advancing 
toward each other and that Chinese troops had 
received their orders from Central Government.”41 
An American officer (Lt. S. H. Hitch, Assistant 
Naval Attaché in China) confirmed the presence of 
Chinese troops at the Tibetan border on May 18. 
The force of Chinese troops along the Tibetan 
border in Qinghai was estimated at 10,000. 
Interestingly this information surfaced through a 
cable by Secretary of State Hull to Atcheson, who 
got the intel of the American officer via the British 
Embassy in Washington, which had learned about 
the Chinese troops from the British Embassy in 
Chongqing.42 It certainly is interesting that the 
State Department received intelligence collected 
by an American officer in China through the 
information network of British Embassies. Clearly, 
Mr. Hitch informed the Department of War. 
However, inter-agency communication in 
Washington in 1943 seems to have been, 
deliberately or not, sub-optimal. 
Throughout the following cables between State 
Department and American Legation in Chongqing, 
reports accumulate that confirm the movement of 
Chinese troops towards the Tibetan border in 
Qinghai; assess the Chinese strategy to be aimed at 
securing transports through Tibet in short-term; 
and to bring Tibet under effective Chinese control 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Document 537. The Secretary of State to the Chargé 
in China (Atcheson), in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
in the long term.43 While evidence of Chinese 
troops at the border was piling up, Mr. T.V. Soong 
had reportedly told Churchill at a Pacific Council 
meeting in Washington on May 20, “that there was 
not and would not be a concentration of Chinese 
troops against Tibet […].”44 
Over the next three months there seemed to be no 
new developments in the issue as far as the State 
Department was concerned, until, on August 17, 
Atcheson received a report sent to Chongqing back 
in July, from the Embassy Officer at Lanzhou 
(John S. Service). It was around July 10, that the 
two OSS officers Tolstoy and Dolan had arrived in 
Lanzhou. Mr. Service described “the attitude of 
Captain Tolstoy and Lieutenant Dolan as being 
strongly pro-Tibetan and critical of China and of 
what appear to be Chinese intentions in regard to 
Tibet.”45 It furthermore becomes clear in this cable 
by Atcheson, that this pro-Tibetan sentiment by 
the two OSS agents had become broadly known 
not only among American officials in China, but 
also to the Chinese Government. Dr. Victor Hoo, 
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs had voiced his 
concerns in this regard to Atcheson stating 
confidentially “that he had received reports to the 
effect that Captain Tolstoy has assured the 
Tibetans that the United States would support 
them in their desire to remain independent of 
China.”46 Dr. Hoo further expresses his surprise 
about these reports as “the United States had 
always shown a ‘very correct attitude’ in regard to 
Tibet.”47  
On August 28, the British confirm the presence of 
Chinese troops at the Tibet-Chinese border, based 
on Indian intelligence reports. They furthermore 
                                                 
43 Document 538. The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to 
the Secretary of State, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
44 Document 539. Memorandum of Conversation, by 
Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine of the Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign Relations of the 
United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China. 
45 Document 542. The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to 
the Secretary of State, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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report an actual arms race along the border, as the 
“Tibetan Government are said to have found it 
necessary to increase their own forces and there is 
considerable nervous tension.”48 Over the 
following cables that reached the State 
Department, there is mounting evidence that the 
number of Chinese troops along the border 
increased. Chinese officials, however, most 
notably the Foreign Ministers Soong and Hoo, 
consequently reaffirm British and American 
officials that there (1) are no Chinese troops at the 
Tibetan border, (2) that even if there were troops at 
the border, China would never invade Tibet and 
(3) that Tibet is considered Chinese territory in the 
first place, and that other nations should not take 
interest in the matter and the actions of the 
Chinese Government in that area.49 
On October 4, the whole diplomatic, and possibly 
military, Tibetan-Chinese-American dilemma 
seems to get resolved. Gauss reports to the 
Secretary of State (Berle), that Chinese officials 
have informed the American Embassy and that 
there is no recent additional troop concentration on 
the Tibet-Qinghai border, “but that he understands 
that ‘some’ airfields are being constructed there by 
the Chinese.”50 The Chinese report seems to be 
correct, since three weeks later another cable from 
Chongqing reaches the State Department that the 
Indian Government complained to the Chinese 
Government about the increased number of 
Chinese planes flying over Tibetan territory. The 
American assessment of this Indian complaint is 
“a further small indication of British interest in 
Tibet as opposed to China’s claim to suzerainty 
over that special area.”51 
                                                 
48 Document 543. The British Embassy to the 
Department of State, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
49 See for example Document 549. The Acting 
Secretary of State to the Ambassador of China (Gauss), 
in Noble and Perkins, Foreign Relations of the United 
States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China. 
50 Document 550. The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to 
the Secretary of State, in in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1943, China. 
51 Document 551. The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to 
the Secretary of State, in Noble and Perkins, Foreign 
 
The whole issue of the almost open conflict 
between Tibet and China resolved as quickly as it 
appeared. Since the year 1943 marked the height 
of WWII in both Europe and Asia, it comes as no 
surprise that this otherwise remarkable incident 
received no further notice and prominence. On the 
one hand, nothing happened in the end, while it 
was naturally in the interest of all allied parties to 
quickly forget about this diplomatically 
embarrassing quagmire. All this has contributed to 
the fact that the Tolstoy-Dolan mission and 
especially the events thereafter is relatively 
unknown in the historic discourse about the WWII 
CBI theater, US-Tibetan relations, as well Sino-US 
relations. 
This article was able to reconstruct the events, 
which largely are unaccounted for in the existing 
literature, through cables sent and received by 
American government agencies. Future research 
on additional sources, most notably British and 
Kuomintang diplomatic cables and intelligence 
reports, could help to confirm the findings of this 
study and to further investigate the topic. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis has investigated the diplomatic 
cables that reached the State Department in the 
year 1943 regarding the situation of Tibet and, in 
particular, the events that unfolded after the visit 
of the two OSS agents to Lhasa in February. The 
source’s general importance lies in that it 
documents the first time that diplomatic relations 
between Tibet and the United States of America 
have been established. While the official purpose 
of the mission was to explore the possibility of a 
supply route from India to China after the Japanese 
had occupied Burma in 1942, the actual secret 
mission of the two agents was to determine Tibet’s 
value for the US greater strategy in the Asian 
theater. 
Furthermore, this analysis investigated whether the 
source informed the discourse on Tibetan 
independence struggles vis-à-vis Chinese claims of 
Tibetan territory and US involvement therein at a 
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very early stage. Shortly after the two OSS agents 
had visited Tibet, assured the Dalai Lama of 
American support of Tibetan independence, and 
relayed the Tibetan request for a radio transmitter 
set to OSS headquarters, which was approved by 
OSS headquarters but discouraged by the State 
Department, the Chongqing Government started to 
assemble as many as 10,000 troops along the 
Qinghai-Tibetan border. This hard fact of Chinese 
troops along the border was confirmed by several 
independent intelligence reports from Indian, 
British, and American sources. The Chinese side, 
most prominently Foreign Minister T.V. Soong, 
repeatedly denied the existence of any Chinese 
troops in the area. 
The reason for the concentration of troops 
apparently gets resolved toward the end of the 
year, when the Chinese inform the American 
Embassy in Chongqing that they were building 
airfields in the area. While the airfields seem to 
have actually been built, it remains unresolved 
why the Chinese side was so unrelenting in not 
telling the truth about their actions along the 
border. The American Embassy and the State 
Department left it at that. Regardless of whether 
the Chinese concentrated troops only to build 
airfields, or whether there was further strategic 
consideration with regard to Tibet involved, the 
Chinese actions in that area led to a considerable 
degree of insecurity in Tibet and prompted the 
enforcement of Tibetan defenses along their border 
to China. 
Another finding of this analysis is the suboptimal 
communication between US government agencies, 
especially between the Department of War and the 
State Department. Often did American diplomats 
learn about developments in the CBI only through 
their British colleagues, including developments 
that involved their own men in uniform, for 
example, the two OSS agents or the case of Navy 
Lieutenant Hitch. While the British embassies in 
Chongqing, Lhasa, New Delhi, and Washington all 
were assisting their American allies through 
intelligence cooperation, it also has to be pointed 
out that London clearly pursued its own strategic 
goals in WWII Asia, an instant that also greatly 
affected the events in Burma the prior year. With 
regards to Tibet, the British repeatedly took the 
official Chinese position regarding the status of 
Tibet under international law, while at the same 
time maintaining their diplomatic relations with 
Tibet. The reason for the British approach in doing 
so may be found in their motivations to not upset 
China, similar to the State Department’s position, 
and assume suzerainty of the Tibetan territory 
once the war was over.  
This article ties together the events that unfolded 
in 1943 after the visit of the two OSS agents - 
Tolstoy and Dolan. In particular, the diplomatic 
dilemma the State Department was confronted 
with vis-à-vis their Chinese allies, and the rising 
tensions between Tibet and Kuomintang troops 
along the Sino-Tibetan border later that year. The 
findings in above analysis inform the discourse on 
later US-Tibetan relations, the Tibetan struggle for 
independence, and US intelligence agencies’ 
involvement therein, especially with regard to CIA 
operations in Tibet in the 1950s under the 
Eisenhower administration.52 Since the CIA is the 
direct successor of the OSS, it can be concluded 
that the Tibetan Government around the Dalai 
Lama, and the US Intelligence Community had a 
history. 
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